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Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted 
redistribution and lower politicians’ rents than proportional representation. We test these 
predictions using micro data for the mixed-member Italian House of Representatives, which 
allow us to sidestep the identification problems of previous studies based on country-level 
data. In particular, we address the nonrandom selection into different electoral systems by 
exploiting a distinctive feature of the Italian two-tier elections from 1994 to 2006: candidates 
could run for both the majoritarian and the proportional tier, but if they won in both tiers they 
had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows 
us to generate quasi-experimental estimates of the impact of the electoral rule. The main 
results confirm theoretical predictions, as majoritarian representatives put forward a higher 
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applies. 1 Introduction
Electoral rules are usually clustered around two opposing types: majoritarian versus
proportional systems. In majoritarian elections—like in the US or the UK—members
of parliament are elected in single-member districts with plurality voting, also known
as the winner-take-all rule. In proportional elections—like in the Netherlands, Spain,
South Africa, and many other countries—party lists compete for votes in multiple-member
districts and parliament seats are allocated to each list according to its vote share.
Political scientists have long studied the impact of these diﬀerent electoral systems
on political outcomes, such as the number of political parties or government structure.
Economists have recently contributed to the subject by developing theoretical models
that show how the electoral system inﬂuences politicians’ equilibrium behaviors and, ulti-
mately, public policies in democratic countries. First of all, the electoral rule determines
which groups in society are pampered by political candidates, that is, whether politicians
address society at large (by, for example, proposing a platform that would please the
median voter) or follow a particularistic strategy (by using targeted beneﬁts to build a
coalition of diversiﬁed interests). In this respect, the majoritarian system, as opposed
to the proportional system, is shown to be associated with more targeted redistribution
and less nationwide public goods (Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001;
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno, 2002).
From a second perspective, the electoral rule also decides how eﬀectively voters can
keep elected oﬃcials accountable for their actions. Assuming that politicians can extract
rents—such as shirking to cultivate private aﬀairs or corruption—from holding an oﬃce,
the interests of voters and politicians diverge. On this point, theoretical predictions about
the impact of the electoral system are ambiguous. If majoritarian elections increased the
accountability of elected oﬃcials, this would result in lower rents (Persson and Tabellini,
1999; 2000). If proportional representation lowered entry barriers for honest competitors,
however, this would also reduce rent extraction (Myerson, 1993).
1In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we provide the ﬁrst micro test of the causal
eﬀect of the electoral system on the behavior of elected oﬃcials.1 We use unique individual
data for the mixed-member Italian House of Representatives from 1994 to 2006, in order
to compare the in-oﬃce activities of politicians elected in single-member majoritarian
districts with those of politicians elected under proportional representation.
Many authors have tested the predictions of the theoretical literature with cross-
country aggregate data, ﬁnding that proportional systems are associated with broader
redistribution and higher perceived corruption.2 The eﬀect of electoral rules on country-
level outcomes, however, may operate not just through politicians’ incentives, but also
through other confounding channels, such as the government structure (single-party ver-
sus multiple-party), that cannot be easily disentangled with macro data. Furthermore,
political institutions are equilibrium outcomes, whose eﬀect is diﬃcult to estimate with
macro data because of the lack of convincing sources of exogenous variation.
The endogeneity problem, of course, might arise with individual-level data too. For
example, candidates with strong local ties, such as those who served in local governments
or have their private business established in a speciﬁc area, may be more likely to run in
majoritarian districts, and once elected they will carry out more locally targeted policies
simply because of their preferences and expertise. The electoral system of the Italian
House of Representatives from 1994 to 2006, however, had distinctive features that can
be exploited to control for endogeneity by applying a Regression Discontinuity Design
(RDD). Speciﬁcally, it had two tiers: 75% of members were elected in single-member
districts, and 25% were elected with proportional representation. Candidates could run
for both the majoritarian and proportional tier; if they were elected in both tiers, they had
to accept the majoritarian seat. As a result, if random factors—for example, unexpected
breaking news or rain on election day—play even a small role in determining electoral
1Frechette, Kagel, and Morelli (2007) use experimental data (i.e., not ﬁeld observational data) to
investigate the trade-oﬀ of potential legislators between the provision of public goods and targeted redis-
tribution, and their focus is on legislative bargaining rather than electoral competition.
2See Persson and Tabellini (1999; 2003); Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002); Persson,
Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003); and Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005).
2outcomes, the selection into the majoritarian tier mimics random assignment for those
elected oﬃcials who won or lost by a narrow margin in single-member districts.3
We use this quasi-experimental framework to estimate the causal eﬀect of the treat-
ment “being elected in the majoritarian system”—as opposed to “being elected in the
proportional system”—on two individual outcomes: the amount of geographically tar-
geted activities carried out after election, and rents. We can focus on being elected, rather
than seeking reelection, under a certain electoral rule, because persistence is very high:
in almost 90% of the cases, if a representative was ﬁrst elected under a certain rule, he
then ran for reelection in the same system. As a measure of local activities, we use the
share of bills targeted to the region of election over the total number of bills presented in
a legislative term. As a proxy for politicians’ rents, we use instead the absenteeism rate,
that is, the percentage of parliamentary votes missed without any legitimate reason. After
controlling for nonrandom selection into the two tiers of the electoral system, we ﬁnd that
being elected in the majoritarian system more than doubles the fraction of targeted bills.
At the same time, it decreases the absenteeism rate by about one third.
Our empirical results show that majoritarian elections are strongly associated with a
greater amount of targeted policies, such as pork-barrel projects favoring local constituen-
cies: projects that—because of a common pool problem—may wind up being overprovided
at the expense of more universal policies. An electoral reform leading to proportional rep-
resentation, however, would produce other side eﬀects, such as rent extraction by elected
oﬃcials who are less accountable to their voters. In this light, our ﬁndings call for a new
eﬀort by scholars in electoral engineering to devise a system that could both reduce the
incentive for pork-barreling and keep politicians accountable for their actions.
2 Theoretical Framework and Related Literature
In this section, we reviewthe theoretical and empirical studies that our contribution builds
on. In particular, Section 2.1 discusses the models that link either targeted redistribution
3See Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), Hainmueller and Kern (2008), and Lee (2008) for diﬀerent
examples of RDD exploiting a narrow margin of victory in single-member elections.
3or politicians’ rent extraction to the electoral system. There, we derive the theoretical
hypotheses that our evaluation exercise tests. Section 2.2 critically reviews the empirical
studies that estimate the eﬀects of the electoral rule using country-level data.
2.1 Theory
Various voting models in political economics have studied the impact of electoral rules
on the provision of broad versus targeted policies. Persson and Tabellini (1999) compare
electoral systems within a probabilistic-voting model, where two oﬃce-seeking candidates
(or parties) make binding electoral promises. Voters are divided into three groups (or
districts). In proportional elections, a candidate wins if he gets more than 50% of the
total votes in a nationwide district. In majoritarian elections, each district is decided
according to the winner-take-all rule, and a candidate wins the general election if he
wins in at least two out of the three districts. It follows that in the proportional system
political competition focuses on swing voters in the population at large (that is, across
districts), while in the majoritarian system competition focuses on swing districts only.
In the latter case, the interests of safe districts are not internalized in the equilibrium
platform presented by the candidates. This mechanism leads to more geographically
targeted policies at the expense of public good provision in the majoritarian system.
In Lizzeri and Persico’s (2001) analysis, politicians are still fully committed to their
electoral platform, but voters are now homogeneous. In the proportional system, there
is a unique nationwide district, and elections are won by the candidate who gets more
than 50% of the votes. In the majoritarian system, there are many local districts, and
elections are won by the candidate who gets more than 50% of the votes in more than
50% of the districts, 25% of the votes being just enough to gain general elections. As the
majoritarian system lowers the size of the minimum winning coalition that can be built
with targeted redistribution, it is less likely to provide public goods.
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) use a diﬀerent rationale to link the elec-
toral system to targeted activities. They build a citizen-candidate model with no com-
mitment to preelection platforms; once appointed, politicians implement their bliss point.
4Citizens are heterogeneous along two dimensions: they belong to three social groups and
three districts. In the ﬁrst stage, three representatives are elected either under the ma-
joritarian system or proportional representation. In the second stage, the government
is randomly formed. Under the assumption that the distribution of social groups is the
same across districts, government oﬃcials belong to the same group in the majoritarian
system. As a result, the median voter in each district chooses a representative biased
toward locally targeted policies, anticipating that policies targeted at social groups are
not contentious. The opposite holds under proportional representation, where the median
voter prefers a representative biased toward socially targeted policies.
Summing up, all of these models share a common prediction about the eﬀect of the
electoral system on politicians’ equilibrium behavior.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Politicians elected in the majoritarian system carry out more geo-
graphically targeted policies than politicians elected in the proportional system.
The political trade-oﬀ between policies with diﬀuse versus concentrated beneﬁts—
the latter also being known as pork-barrel projects—has been studied from a slightly
diﬀerent perspective in political science and Public Choice. On the political demand side,
concentrated beneﬁts overshadow diﬀuse costs, because of the lower transaction costs
that smaller groups face when they want to get organized and support their interests
(Olson, 1973). On the supply side, politicians have an incentive to provide policies whose
beneﬁts are targeted to speciﬁc groups, as legislators seeking reelection favor projects
for which they can easily claim credit (Mayhew, 1974). Lancaster (1986) builds a bridge
between the pork-barrel literature and the electoral rule, predicting an inverse relationship
between district size and pork-barrel activity. This is because of a free-rider problem
among politicians: if you are the only one representing a district, it is easier to get
political credit for locally targeted policies. Note that this literature—unlike the previous
models—uses the implicit assumption that politicians who belong to the same party are
imperfect substitutes for each other from the voters’ point of view. Furthermore, the
5focus is on postelection rather than preelection politics, that is, the relevant treatment
coincides with seeking reelection, rather than being elected, under a certain rule.
Politicians’ rents are another outcome usually thought to be inﬂuenced by the electoral
system. If monitoring is less than perfect, elected oﬃcials can shirk, that is, put low eﬀort
into their public duties to cultivate private interests, or they can exploit their discretionary
authority to obtain bribes. Either in the form of shirking or plain corruption, politicians’
rents depend on the degree of voters’ monitoring over elected oﬃcials and on the intensity
of the punishment for misbehaviors, and the electoral system determines both elements.
In Persson and Tabellini’s (1999) model discussed above, rents are a component of the
electoral promise made by candidates. In the majoritarian system, only swing districts are
relevant and, because voters in these districts are more reactive to policy changes, political
competition is stiﬀer; politicians become more disciplined and extract lower equilibrium
rents. Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 9) use a diﬀerent setup to derive the same result.
They build a career-concern model in which elected oﬃcials care about reelection. Under
majoritarian elections, characterized by individual-candidate ballot, reelection opportu-
nities are based on individual reputation. Elected oﬃcials have an incentive both to exert
eﬀort and to avoid corruption. On the contrary, under proportional representation with
closed party lists, reelection depends on the individual rank in the list decided by the
party leadership and on the overall performance of the list, which is only loosely linked to
individual behaviors. This creates a free-rider problem among candidates in the same list.
As a result, the higher the proportion of representatives elected with individual-candidate
ballot, like in majoritarian elections, the lower politicians’ rents.
Unlike the prediction about targeted activities(H1), however, the relationship between
the electoral system and politicians’ rents is not unambiguous. Myerson (1993) sets up
a game-theoretic model showing that the proportional system may reduce entry barriers
for honest politicians and, consequently, equilibrium rents.4 Political parties diﬀer along
two dimensions: ideology (left versus right) and honesty (honest versus dishonest). Some
4See also Myerson (1999).
6voters prefer the leftist party, while others prefer the rightist party; but all voters prefer
honest parties. With plurality voting, a dishonest party can still clinch power. As a
matter of fact, one of the possible equilibria is the self-fulﬁlling prophecy that a close race
between two dishonest candidates takes place. If voters believe that their ﬁrst-best choice
(that is, the honest party whose ideology they share) has no chance of winning, they
rationally vote for the dishonest party with the same ideology. This cannot happen under
proportional representation, where voters are free to pick their ﬁrst-best choice, because
by doing so they will increase honesty without aﬀecting the balance between left and right
in the parliament. Equilibrium rents are therefore lower than in the majoritarian case.
The size of the electoral district—which in turn aﬀects the degree of entry barriers for
well-behaving politicians—is the crucial feature lying behind this result.
We can now derive a second prediction about the eﬀect of the electoral system on
politicians’ equilibrium behavior.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): If the accountability eﬀect dominates the entry-barrier eﬀect, politi-
cians elected in the majoritarian system extract less rents than politicians elected in
the proportional system.
2.2 Macro Tests
The models discussed in the previous section have motivated a large number of empirical
studies that use cross-country data to test the eﬀects of the electoral rule on aggregate
outcomes. Persson and Tabellini (2003) ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the ma-
joritarian system on both welfare state spending (as a proxy for broad, nontargeted redis-
tribution) and the perceived level of corruption (as a proxy for politicians’ rents).5 These
results are robust to the use of diﬀerent estimation strategies (OLS, matching estimators,
parametric selection corrections, ﬁxed-eﬀect panel models, and IV).
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) use OLS and panel estimators with
country-speciﬁc shocks to evaluate the eﬀect of the electoral system on both public goods
5This extensive empirical analysis on the electoral rule builds on previous work by the authors, such
as Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003).
7(intendedhere as a measure of policiestargeted to geographic constituencies) and transfers
(as a measure of policies targeted to social constituencies). As for the electoral system,
they build a new measure of proportionality, inversely related to the share of votes that
guarantees a parliament seat in a district of average size, and they use it in association
with other measures commonly used in political science. They ﬁnd a positive and signif-
icant relationship between the degree of proportionality and transfer spending in OECD
countries, but no conclusive evidence on the provision of public goods.
The above studies ﬁnd weak support for the hypothesis that the majoritarian sys-
tem increases targeted policies, and strong support for the hypothesis that it reduces
politicians’ rents. Macro tests, however, come with two main drawbacks: a data problem
and, more relevantly, an identiﬁcation problem. On the data side, results may be sensitive
both to the classiﬁcation of electoral systems across countries and to the way the variables
speciﬁed in the theoretical models are approximated in the data.6 On the identiﬁcation
side, although macro tests detect important correlations that are consistent with the the-
ory, it is doubtful that they are able to disclose causal eﬀects. OLS and matching rely
on the conditional independence assumption, that is, on the exogeneity of the electoral
rule. However the electoral rule, like any other political institution, is an equilibrium
outcome determined by numerous factors which cannot be fully controlled. Panel esti-
mators can accommodate for (time-invariant) country-speciﬁc confounding factors, but
usually within-country variation in the electoral rule is either insuﬃcient to obtain ac-
curate estimates, or so concentrated in certain period (e.g., the 1990s) to be exposed to
time-speciﬁc confounding factors. Among the estimators employed in the macro tests,
only IV can claim to disclose causal eﬀects. This claim, however, relies on the plausibility
of (untestable) exclusion restrictions, which are not always compelling.7
6For instance, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) use government expenditure for public
goods as a measure of geographically targeted redistribution, while Persson and Tabellini (1999) use the
same type of expenditure as a measure of broad redistribution.
7Among the instruments used by Persson and Tabellini (2003) in the IV setup, there are: three
electoral-reform dating variables, under the assumption that the adoption of a new electoral system
follows waves at the international level; language variables, to control for colonial and cultural inﬂuences;
and latitude. See Acemoglu (2005) for a detailed criticism of this set of instruments.
8Furthermore, even if we assume that macro tests are able to disclose the causal eﬀects
of the electoral rule, it is not beyond question that they are actually testing the theo-
retical hypotheses H1 and H2. Most macro studies implicitly assume that the eﬀects of
the electoral system on politicians’ equilibrium behaviors are the only link in the chain
of causation from the electoral system to country-level outcomes. Suppose, on the con-
trary, that the electoral system aﬀects aggregate outcomes not only through the eﬀect on
politicians’ behaviors but also through an eﬀect on the number of parties and the govern-
ment structure (single-party versus multiple-party), as suggested by Persson, Roland, and
Tabellini (2007). In this case, macro tests, far from testing H1 and H2, would estimate the
joint impact of the direct and indirect eﬀects of the electoral rule on aggregate variables.
3 The Italian Two-Tier Electoral System
The electoral rules for the Italian Parliament have changed frequently over time. Up to
the legislative term XI (1992–1994), members of parliament were elected under an open-
list proportional system with large districts (32 for the House of Representatives, with
3 to 54 seats per district depending on the population; 21 for the Senate, with 1 to 47
seats per district). Starting with the legislative term XII (1994–1996) and up to the XIV
(2001–2006), members of parliament were instead elected with a two-tier system (25%
proportional and 75% majoritarian).8 Electoral rules changed again with the legislative
term XV (2006–present), switching to a closed-list proportional system with 27 districts
in the House (3 to 44 seats per district) and 20 in the Senate (1 to 47 seats per district).
In every legislative term, the total number of seats has remained unchanged at 945, of
which 630 are in the House of Representatives and 315 in the Senate.
8Triggered by the increasing diﬀusion of two-tier electoral systems worldwide, political scientists have
recently turned their attention to this hybrid system. Lancaster and Patterson (1990) ﬁnd that German
majoritarian representatives quote targeted projects as important for their reelection more often than
proportional representatives. Stratmann and Baur (2002) ﬁnd that German majoritarian representatives
are more likely to be assigned to “district-type” than to “party-type” committees. Kunicova and Rem-
ington (2008) ﬁnd that majoritarian members of the Russian State Duma, when voting over the federal
budget, show less party loyalty than proportional members, suggesting that they may trump their parti-
san ties to cultivate their regional constituencies. All of these studies use subjective measures of targeted
activities, disregard self-selection issues, and do not look at rents.
9We use data for the three legislative terms with two-tier elections (1994–96, 1996–
2001, 2001–06). In particular, we focus on the House of Representatives, because only
in this branch of parliament were legislators actually elected under two separate systems,
with voters receiving two ballots on election day: one to cast a vote for a candidate in
their single-member district, and another to cast a vote for a party list in their larger
proportional district. 75% of House members were elected with plurality voting in 475
single-member districts, while 25% of members were elected from closed party lists in
26 multiple-member districts (2 to 12 seats per district). On the contrary, in the Senate,
votersreceivedonly one ballot to cast their vote for a candidate ina single-member district,
and the best losers in the 232 majoritarian districtswere assigned to the remaining 83 seats
according to proportional representation. Therefore, only for the House of Representatives
were the two electoral systems perceived as distinct by voters. These two tiers represented
distinct playing ﬁelds, where political actors made diﬀerent electoral promises and were
then called to answer for them in a separate way.
In particular, for the purpose of this paper, we exploit a distinctive institutional fea-
ture of the two-tier electoral system for the House. Candidates could run for both the
majoritarian and proportional tier. If they were elected in both tiers, however, they had
to accept the majoritarian seat. If they lost the majoritarian competition, they could
still obtain a parliament seat, as long as they were ranked high on their party list. The
visibility of each dual candidate was then based on the electoral tier he eventually wound
up being elected in: if he had been elected in the majoritarian tier, he was recognized
as the oﬃcial leader of his political coalition in the district; if he had been elected in
the proportional tier, he was perceived as one of the members of the national party elite.
And media coverage reinforced citizens’ perception in these directions. Of course, not
all candidates were running for both tiers. National leaders were more likely to be dual
candidates, but usually not in marginal (nonsafe) districts.
In the next section, we formally describe our evaluation strategy and how it exploits
the above institutional framework.
104 Evaluation Framework
We are interested in estimating the causal eﬀect of the treatment “being elected in the
majoritarian system”—as opposed to “being elected in the proportional system”—on
two sets of outcomes: geographically targeted in-oﬃce activities, and politicians’ rents.9
Using Rubin’s (1974) potential-outcome framework for causal inference, deﬁne Yi(1) as
the potential outcome of politician i in the case he is elected in the majoritarian system,
and Yi(0) as the potential outcome of the same politician in the case he is elected in the
proportional system. The variable Ti deﬁnes the treatment status of i: Ti = 1 if he was
elected in the majoritarian tier, and Ti = 0 if he was elected in the proportional tier. The
observed outcome is then written as: Yi = Ti · Yi(1) + (1 − Ti) · Yi(0).
The simple conditional comparison of the observed outcomes of treated and untreated
politicians does not generally provide an unbiased estimate of the average treatment eﬀect
of interest, as politicians with diﬀerent unobservable characteristics aﬀecting the outcome
may self-select into diﬀerent systems. For instance, individuals with strong local ties
(such as politicians who served in local governments or businessmen rooted in a speciﬁc
region) may be more likely to run in the majoritarian tier to take advantage of their local
popularity. Once elected, these members of parliament will carry out more geographically
targeted policies simply because of their preferences and expertise, and not because of
the eﬀect of the electoral rule. The fact that some politicians are candidates in both tiers
of Italian House elections, however, can be exploited to implement an RDD and evaluate
the causal eﬀect of the electoral system on the outcome variables.10
9See Section 5 for a precise description of the outcome variables.
10See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Van der Klaauw (2008) for a survey on RDD. Various empirical
studies have exploited the assignment mechanism generated by the margin of victory in single-member
plurality elections to estimate a causal eﬀect of interest: Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) evaluate whether
an exogenous shift in the strength of the US Democratic Party makes both the Democratic and Republican
nominees in the next election move to the left of the political spectrum, meaning that voters aﬀect policy
formation; Lee (2008) estimates the eﬀect of incumbency on the probability of winning the next election
in the US; Hainmueller and Kern (2008) estimate the contamination eﬀect of the electoral outcome in
the majoritarian tier on the outcome in the proportional tier in German mixed-member elections.
114.1 Identiﬁcation
Assume, to begin with, that candidates in the House election run for both a majoritarian
and a proportional seat; that is, they are all dual candidates. Voters decide who is assigned
to the majoritarian tier, as a politician who wins in a single-member district must accept
that seat; in other words, he cannot opt for the proportional tier in the case he also wins
in the majoritarian tier. Treatment assignment can be speciﬁed as:
Ti = 1[MVi ≥ 0], (1)
where MVi is the margin of victory in the single-member district and 1[.] the indicator
function. The margin of victory is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the vote share of i
and the vote share of the next-best candidate: if i won, MVi measures his distance from
the candidate who scored second; if i lost, MVi measures the distance from the candidate
who scored ﬁrst. As a result, if MVi ≥ 0, i must accept the majoritarian seat (Ti = 1),
while, if MVi < 0, i is elected in the proportional tier (Ti = 0). This assignment rule
is an example of sharp RDD, as the probability of receiving the treatment has a sharp
discontinuity (equal to 1) at the threshold MVi = 0. In what follows, we borrow from Lee
(2008) in stating the identiﬁcation conditions required by an RDD of this type. We then
discuss an additional assumption required by our data.
The margin MVi can be seen as a random variable depending on observable and un-
observable individual characteristics, as well as on general occurrences on election day.
Deﬁne Ui as an unobservable individual characteristic (e.g., political skills) aﬀecting Yi(1),
Yi(0), MVi, and the observed individual characteristics Xi at the same time. The rela-
tionship between Ui and MVi is assumed to meet the following conditions.
Assumption 1 Deﬁne F(MV |Ui = u) as the cumulative distribution function of MVi
conditional on Ui and, for each u in the support of Ui, assume that:
a. 0 < F(0|Ui = u) < 1;
b. F(MV|Ui = u) is continuously diﬀerentiable in MV at MV = 0.
12Assumption 1 states that politicians can aﬀect their electoral outcome, but their (posi-
tive or negative) margin of victory includessome random element, so that their probability
of winning in the majoritarian district is never equal to 0 or 1 (condition a). Furthermore,
for each politician the probabilities of winning or losing the majoritarian race by a narrow
margin are the same (condition b).11 In other words, electoral outcomes depend on both
predictable elements and random chance, which is then crucial only for close races. For
instance, heavy rain on election day may inﬂuence turnout and, as a result, the victory
of one candidate instead of the other in marginal districts. Furthermore, even if it is
plausible that political parties identify close electoral races in advance and exert extra
eﬀort to win them, this is true for all parties; as a result, political competition prevents
each party from sorting above the threshold.
Lee (2008) shows that under Assumption 1:
lim
￿↑0
E(Ui|MVi = ￿) = lim
￿↓0
E(Ui|MVi = ￿) (2)
lim
￿↑0
E(Xi|MVi = ￿) = lim
￿↓0
E(Xi|MVi = ￿). (3)
It follows that:
E(Yi(0)|MVi = 0) = lim
￿↑0
E(Yi(0)|Ti = 0,MVi = ￿) = lim
￿↑0
E(Yi|MVi = ￿) (4)
E(Yi(1)|MVi = 0) = lim
￿↓0
E(Yi(1)|Ti = 1,MVi = ￿) = lim
￿↓0
E(Yi|MVi = ￿). (5)
Therefore, the estimable quantity [lim￿↓0 E(Yi|MVi = ￿) − lim￿↑0 E(Yi|MVi = ￿)] has the
causal interpretation of the average treatment eﬀect at the threshold:
ATErdd ≡ E(Yi(1) − Yi(0)|MVi = 0) = lim
￿↓0
E(Yi|MVi = ￿) − lim
￿↑0
E(Yi|MVi = ￿). (6)
It should be noted that ATErdd is a local eﬀect, which cannot be extrapolated to
the whole population without additional homogeneity assumptions. As usual in RDD,
the gain in internal validity is associated with a loss in external validity. Furthermore,
11These conditions are equivalent to the standard assumption in RDD that potential outcomes, as a
function of the assignment variable, must not show any discontinuity at the threshold (Hahn, Todd, and
Van der Klaauw, 2001), but they are more easily interpretable in the setting of plurality elections.
13this local eﬀect, deﬁned for close electoral races only, has ﬁrst-order theoretical relevance
in the present application. As a matter of fact, Persson and Tabellini (1999) identify
political competition in swing districts exactly as the driving force behind the eﬀect of
the electoral rule on targeted policies and rents.
Not all politicians in our sample, however, are dual candidates; some of them ran ex-
clusively for election in the majoritarian tier and others in the proportional tier. Because
of a data restriction, we cannot implement our evaluation strategy on dual candidates
only. As we do not observe the ranking in party lists, we are not able to identify majori-
tarian dual candidates. We can only identify proportional dual candidates, that is, those
proportional representatives who also ran, and lost, in a single-member district. This
gives rise to a treatment assignment slightly diﬀerent from the mechanism in equation
(1). If MVi < 0, we have either Ti = 0 (if i was a dual candidate) or Ti = . (if i was only
a majoritarian candidate).
This problem, however, can be addressed thanks to an additional aspect of candi-
dates selection. National leaders—who are not representative of the entire population of
politicians—tend to be dual candidates, but they also get safe districts where the race
is lopsided in favor of their party. We indeed observe that national leaders are overrep-
resented in safe districts: their presence nearly doubles in districts where their political
party won by more than 10 percentage points in the last election (39%) against districts
where it won by a lower margin (19%); and their presence doubles in districts where their
party won in the last election (26%) against districts where it lost (13%). The remaining
dual candidacies are allocated to runners in marginal districts as a compensation device
or “parachute”. However, because there are not enough dual candidacies to secure all
runners in nonsafe districts (75% of the seats being allocated with the majoritarian sys-
tem against only 25% with proportional representation), some marginal runners do not
receive any parachute, even if they are very similar to those who obtain it. In other words,
we can state the following assumption for nonsafe candidates.
14Assumption 2 In a small left-neighborhood of the threshold, dual candidates are a rep-
resentative sample of all candidates in single-member districts, that is:
lim
￿↑0
E(Ui|MVi = ￿,Ti = .) = lim
￿↑0
E(Ui|MVi = ￿,Ti = 0).
Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, in a sample made up of all representatives
elected in the majoritarian tier (MVi ≥ 0) and of those representatives elected in the
proportional tier who were also dual candidates (MVi < 0), equation (6) can be used to
estimate the causal eﬀects of interest.
We are aware that Assumption 2 is not innocuous, but its plausibility can be assessed
with a large set of testing procedures. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that, if
equations (2) and (3) were satisﬁed, this would imply that Assumption 1 and Assumption
2 are both veriﬁed. Of course, equation (2) is untestable by deﬁnition, but it can be
indirectlyassessed in various ways, while equation (3) can be directlytested. Andrejecting
(3) would cast serious doubts on (2), particularly for those Xi that are likely to be aﬀected
by the same unobservables that inﬂuence potential outcomes. In other words, we can
apply the same array of tests commonly used in the RDD literature to assess the overall
validity of our evaluation strategy. First, the pretreatment characteristics Xi should
not display any discontinuity at the threshold (balance tests). Second, the estimated
ATErdd should be insensitive to the introduction of covariates (balance tests of relevant
covariates). Third, as pretreatment outcomes are also available, the implementation of an
RDD on these additional data should produce a zero ATErdd (falsiﬁcation tests). Fourth,
the assignment variable MVi should display no discontinuities at fake threshold levels
diﬀerent from MVi = 0 (placebo tests).
If all of these validity tests produced the expected results, the joint plausibility of
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 would be robustly supported by the data.
4.2 Estimation
Various semiparametric and nonparametric estimation methods have been proposed to
implement equation (6), which is basically a problem of estimating the boundary points
15of two regression functions. We apply two methods: the split polynomial approximation
used by Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) and Lee (2008), and the local linear regression
advocated by Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
The ﬁrst method uses the whole sample and chooses a ﬂexible speciﬁcation to ﬁt
the relationship between Yi and MVi on either side of the threshold. The estimated
discontinuity at the threshold is the treatment eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the model:
Yi = α + τTi + (δ1MVi + ...+ δpMV
p
i ) + (β1Ti · MVi + ... + βpTi · MV
p
i ) + ηi, (7)
using OLS. Standard inference procedures can be applied. As the same politician may
be observed in diﬀerent legislative terms, we use robust standard errors with cluster
correction at the individual level to control for intra-politician correlation in the error
term ηi. As MVi is equal to zero at the threshold, the coeﬃcient τ identiﬁes ATErdd.
Usually, a third-grade polynomial (p = 3) is used in the empirical literature.
The above method is attractive for many reasons, although a possible concern is
that it may be sensitive to outcome values for observations far away from the threshold
(Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). To avoid this, the second method restricts the estimation
to a compact support, and ﬁts linear regression functions to the observations within a
distance h on either side of the threshold. In other words, we restrict the sample to
politicians in the interval MVi ∈ [−h,+h] and estimate the model:
Yi = α + τTi + δMVi + βTi · MVi + ηi, (8)
using OLS. The bandwidth h can be selected applying the cross-validation method pro-
posed by Ludwig and Miller (2007) and formalized by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), but
the sensitivity of the estimates to the choice of h should be assessed.12






(Yi − ˆ µh(MVi))2, (9)
where the predictions ˆ µh(MVi) are retrieved as follows. For every MVi to the left (right) of the threshold,
we predict its value as if it were at the boundary of the estimation, using only observations in the interval
[MVi − h,MVi] ([MVi,MVi + h]). Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we calculate the loss function
for a subsample of politicians, discarding 50% of the observations on either side of the threshold MVi = 0.
164.3 Interpretation
A ﬁnal remark concerns the use of a two-tier system to estimate the eﬀect of the electoral
rule under which politicians are elected. Our evaluation framework rests on the implicit
assumption that the two tiers of the Italian electoral system were separate playing ﬁelds,
and that political agents—parties and candidates—aimed at winning in both tiers, where
they responded to the diﬀerent incentives of political competition under majoritarian
versus proportional elections. Once elected, representatives owed their visibility to the
tier they were elected in, being in charge of the promises their party had made there.
Whenever the majoritarian and proportional tiers coexist, however, one may argue
that there are some spillovers between the two systems; for instance, a representative
elected in the proportional tier might seek reelection in the majoritarian tier, responding
to the incentives of the second system instead of the ﬁrst. Our data show that the possible
spillovers are limited, as only 9% of House members from 1994 to 2006 switched from one
tier to the other. And, even more notably, the fraction of politicians simply trying to
be reelected in a diﬀerent tier—a decision that was formalized only a few months before
the upcoming election—was equally small: only 10% (17%) of majoritarian (proportional)
representativesran for reelection in the proportional (majoritarian) tier. This means that,
in almost 90% of the cases, if a representative was ﬁrst elected under a certain rule, he
then ran for reelection in the same system. As our evaluation strategy partly relies on
dual candidates, it is also important to note that the persistence in the status of dual
candidate is low: only 27% of all dual candidates received this parachute more than once,
and this number decreases to 17% if we disregard national leaders. If a politician had the
chance to be a dual candidate, he could not safely expect to get this opportunity again,
unless he was a national leader.
Furthermore, even if some spillovers were actually at work, our estimates would result
in a lower bound of the true causal eﬀect, unless the size of spillovers were implausibly
high. Assume that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the belief of a majoritarian candidate to run for reelection
in the proportional tier, while 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the belief of a proportional candidate to run
17for reelection in the majoritarian tier. In other words, α is the possible spillover of the
proportional on the majoritarian tier, while β is the spillover of the majoritarian on the
proportional tier. In this case, the true potential outcomes linked to the incentives of
the majoritarian versus the proportional system—Y ∗(1), Y ∗(0)—diﬀer from the potential
outcomes—Y (1), Y (0)—of our evaluation framework:
Y (1) = (1 − α)Y
∗(1) + αY
∗(0) (10)
Y (0) = (1 − β)Y
∗(0) + βY
∗(1). (11)
As a result, as long as α + β < 1, the ATErdd that we estimate is a lower bound of the
true ATE∗
rdd, that is: ATErdd = (1 − α − β)ATE∗
rdd.
Because of the institutional setting and the descriptive evidence just provided, we can
safely rule out the possibility that the attempt of seeking reelection in a diﬀerent tier is
so relevant that α + β > 1. This would increase the power of our tests of H1 and H2, if
we detected a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the electoral system on the outcome variables.
5 Data
We use data about the members of the Italian House of Representatives from 1994 to
2006, which is the period when a two-tier electoral system was in place (see Section 3).13
The dataset contains the following individual information: demographic characteristics
(age, gender, marital status, number of children, place of birth, place of residence, level
and ﬁeld of education); self-declared previous job (before entering parliament for the
ﬁrst time); number and type of bills as main sponsor (geographic area covered by the
bill);14 absenteeism (the number of electronic votes missed without any legitimate reason);
appointments in the parliament (president, vice president, and secretary either of the
13The sources we used to collect the data include: the Annals of the Italian Parliament (La Navicella)
for demographic and professional information; the online archive of bills for the legislative activity; and
the Italian Parliament Statistical Oﬃce for data on individual attendance.
14Bills are classiﬁed using the TE.SE.O. system (TEsauro SEnato per l’Organizzazione dei documenti
parlamentari), consisting of 3,668 hierarchical terms (e.g., from “art” to “urban architecture”) and 9,602
geographical places (single entities, like a museum, included). For each bill, the Documentation Center
of the Italian Parliament reports each region, province or town presenting any aﬃnity with the bill.
18parliament or of a legislative committee) and in the government (minister, vice minister);
party aﬃliation and political experience (member of the directive board of the party at the
local, regional, and national level); local government experience (mayor, city councillor,
president of a region, etc.); system of election, electoral district, and vote share.
After dropping observations containing at least one missing value for some of the rele-
vant variables, we end up with a sample of 1,699 observations, of whom 1,305 were elected
in the majoritarian tier and 394 in the proportional tier.15 Table 1 provides descriptive
statistics for this sample, comparing treated (i.e., majoritarian) and untreated (i.e., pro-
portional) politicians. As expected, these two groups display diﬀerent characteristics,
suggesting that self-selection in the choice of the electoral system is at work: females and
national politicians are more likelyto be elected in the proportional tier. Available proxies
for local attachment, such as the dummies for “local government” (previous institutional
experience at the region, province, or town level) and “diﬀerent residence” (the province
of residence diﬀerent from the district of election), are also not balanced, majoritarian
politicians being more attached to their local constituency.
To test the hypotheses H1 and H2 derived in Section 2.1, we use two outcomes: (1)
the fraction of bills targeted to the region of election over the total number of bills pre-
sented as main sponsor during the legislative term; (2) the fraction of parliament votes
missed without any legitimate reason over the total number of electronic votes during the
legislative term. We use the fraction, instead of the number of targeted bills, to control
for the diﬀerent levels of intensity in bills sponsorship between majoritarian and propor-
tional representatives. The share of bills tailored to speciﬁc areas can be seen as a proxy
of targeted redistribution, because of the resources moved by the bills themselves or by
assuming that the hierarchy of interests shown by politicians in their bills is unchanged
in other activities (for example, bargaining for funds with the Treasury Minister). The
use of the absenteeism rate rests on the idea that shirking is a type of rent. As shown by
15The 1,699 observations of the ﬁnal sample correspond to 1,218 politicians, of whom 871 were always
elected in the majoritarian tier, 237 were always elected in the proportional tier, and 110 switched from
one tier to the other across the three legislative terms.
19Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2008), the absenteeism rate is positively corre-
lated with the amount of politicians’ outside income, supporting the view that shirking
allows the cultivation of private interests. Absences, however, are a more precise measure
of rents with respect to outside income. This is because they embrace not only the time
used to attend outside economic activities, but also leisure, which is another side of rents.
Descriptive statistics about bills sponsorship and absences are reported in Table 2.
Majoritarian representatives, on average, present more bills than their proportional col-
leagues, although the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The fraction of
targeted bills is signiﬁcantly higher for majoritarian (11.2%) than for proportional politi-
cians (7.3%). Conversely, the absenteeism rate is signiﬁcantly higher for proportional
(36.6%) than for majoritarian politicians (30.9%). Although this descriptive evidence is
far from detecting causal eﬀects of the electoral rule, the gross eﬀects captured by the
mean diﬀerences (0.039 for the share of targeted bills and –0.057 for the absenteeism rate)
also have a meaningful interpretation: they describe the joint impact of the causal rela-
tionship, selection on observables, and unobservable self-selection. OLS estimates with
a full set of covariates—which control for selection on observables but not for unobserv-
able self-selection—give an eﬀect of 0.037 (standard error, 0.011) on the share of targeted
bills and –0.078 (standard error, 0.019) on the absenteeism rate. In the next section, we
present the RDD estimates, which isolate the causal eﬀect of the majoritarian electoral
system and directly test the theoretical hypotheses H1 and H2.
Table 3 describesthe distributionof the margin of victory MVi, whichis the assignment
variable in the RDD exercise. This table providesevidence supporting Assumption 2 of the
identiﬁcation strategy. In fact, if proportional dual candidates were representative of all
candidates who lost in single-member districts, we would observe very similar numbers in
the two sides of the distribution of MVi, positive for majoritarian politicians and negative
for proportional politicians. Table 3 shows that the two sides of MVi are very close to one
another, especially in small neighborhoods of the threshold level MVi = 0, where they are
almost identical. The diﬀerence between the absolute value of MVi for majoritarian and
20proportional politicians is never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, excluding the case of the
large interval [–20,20]. Robust statistical evidence supporting Assumption 2, however,
can only come from the RDD validity tests.
6 Econometric Results
6.1 Estimated Eﬀects of the Electoral System
We provide a graphical representation of the eﬀect of the electoral system on the outcome
variables at the threshold in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 1 reports the running-mean
smoothing of the share of locally targeted bills with respect to the RDD assignment vari-
able MVi.16 The used bandwidth is equal to one percentage point. The smoothing is
performed separately on either side of the threshold to let the possible jump at MVi = 0
show up if it exists. Politicians below zero were elected in the proportional tier, while
politicians above zero were elected in the majoritarian tier. Indeed, the jump is clearly
visible and positive, meaning that in the neighborhood of the threshold majoritarian rep-
resentatives present more targeted bills than their proportional colleagues. It is also worth
noting that the higher the distance from the threshold, the lower the share of targeted
bills (especially on the right of MVi = 0). This is consistent with our interpretation:
politicians in close electoral races strongly commit themselves to their constituency, while
politicians who are sure to win do not target their activity at the local district.
Figure 2 performs the same running-mean smoothing for the absenteeism rate. The
jump at zero is visible but negative in this case, meaning that in the neighborhood of the
threshold shirking is greater for proportional politicians. Here, the behaviors of majori-
tarian representatives do not change much when we get farther from the threshold (i.e.,
the curve is ﬂat on the right of MVi = 0). On the contrary, proportional representatives
make even more absences if they lost by a high margin in the majoritarian tier.
The RDD estimates on the fraction of geographically targeted bills reported in Table 4
provide a way of testing H1, that is, whether politicians in the majoritarian system carry
16On smoothing scatterplots, see Cleveland (1979).
21out more pork-barrel activities than politicians in the proportional system. The ﬁnal
RDD sample consists of all majoritarian representatives (1,305) and proportional dual
candidates (141), for a total of 1,446 observations. In columns (I) and (II), the estimated
model is the split polynomial approximation, which makes use of all observations; a third-
grade polynomial is used. Column (I) reports the estimate without control variables, while
in column (II) we add the full set of covariates.
Being elected in the majoritarian system entails an increase in the share of geograph-
ically targeted bills of 8.2 percentage points, that is, it more than doubles the share of
targeted bills with respect to the predicted value of 6.4 for proportional representatives
at the threshold (7.0 for proportional representatives in the 5%-neighborhood). The two
estimates of columns (I) and (II) are almost identical, supporting the assumption that
relevant covariates (i.e., covariates aﬀecting the outcome) do not display any discontinuity
at the threshold. This provides ﬁrst evidence on the validity of our evaluation framework.
As expected, politicians with local government experience work more for their geographic
constituency, while national politicians and representatives with parliament appointments
work less. Columns (III) and (IV), where we use the local linear regression model, check
the robustness of the RDD estimates with respect to the use of observations far away from
the threshold. The bandwidth h is selected using the cross-validation method, and it is
equal to 15.17 Point estimates are very close to the previous ones, and again the inclu-
sion of covariates does not aﬀect the result. All the estimated eﬀects of the majoritarian
system reported in Table 4 are statistically signiﬁcant at either a 1% or 5% level.18
The RDD estimates on the absenteeism rate, reported in Table 5, provide a way of
testing H2, that is, whether politicians in the majoritarian system extract lower rents than
politicians in the proportional system. Here, we carry out the same estimations of Table
4, but we make use of a slightly diﬀerent sample because of missing values. According
17Results are qualitatively similar for all levels of h varying from 1 to 15.
18As a robustness check, we estimated the same RDD speciﬁcations in Table 4 using a ML estimator
instead of OLS, because the decision of presenting targeted bills may involve two stages: (1) decide
whether to present bills or not; (2) in case you present them, choose how many for the district of election.
The baseline ML estimates with split polynomial approximation and local linear regression are equal to
0.089 (standard error, 0.039) and 0.073 (standard error, 0.033), respectively.
22to the baseline estimate with polynomial approximation in column (I), being elected in
the majoritarian system entails a fall in the absenteeism rate equal to 14.9 percentage
points, that is, a fall of more than 30% with respect to the predicted value of 47.7 for
proportional representatives at the threshold (42.4 for proportional representatives in the
5%-neighborhood). Taking into account covariates, in column (II), the eﬀect is slightly
lower, equal to a fall of 10.9 percentage points. The two estimates, however, are not
statistically diﬀerent from one another. The point estimates obtained with local linear
regression, in columns (III) and (IV), are very similar to the previous ones.19 All estimated
eﬀects of the majoritarian system in Table 5 are signiﬁcant at either a 1% or 5% level.20
The above RDD estimates strongly support the theoretical hypotheses H1 and H2,
showing—with respect to the latter—that the accountability eﬀect of the majoritarian
system dominates the entry-barrier eﬀect and reduces the amounts of politicians’ rents.
6.2 Validity Tests
The validity of our evaluation strategy—that is, the joint validity of Assumption 1 and
Assumption 2—can be assessed with diﬀerent testing procedures. Remember that in the
previous section we have already veriﬁedthat the inclusion of pretreatment covariates does
not inﬂuence point estimates, which are never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those without
covariates. This is like a balance test of relevant covariates: only if pretreatment variables
with a strong eﬀect on the outcome variable were not balanced in the neighborhood
of the threshold would the estimate with covariates diverge from the baseline estimate.
Here, we perform three additional types of validity tests. First, we check whether all of
the covariates Xi are balanced in the neighborhood of the threshold. Second, we run a
falsiﬁcation test by using pretreatment information. Some politicians, in fact, were in
oﬃce before the electoral reform of 1994, when all members of parliament were elected
19The optimal bandwidth h, chosen with the cross-validation method, is now equal to 14. Results are
qualitatively similar for most levels of h varying from 1 to 15.
20As a robustness check, we estimated the same RDD speciﬁcations in Table 5 using the GLM estimator
proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), because the absenteeism rate is bounded between 0 and 1.
The baseline GLM estimates with split polynomial approximation and local linear regression are equal
to –0.146 (standard error, 0.052) and –0.125 (standard error, 0.043), respectively.
23under proportional representation. As we observe their bills in this pretreatment period
(speciﬁcally, in term X, from 1987 to 1992, and in term XI, from 1992 to 1994), we repeat
the RDD estimation using the past share of targeted bills as dependent variable. Third,
we implement placebo tests by estimating the treatment eﬀect at fake threshold levels.
Table 6 reports a ﬁrst type of balance tests, that is, local linear regressions (h = 10)
with each covariate as dependent variable. Except for the self-employment dummy, no
pretreatment characteristic shows a signiﬁcant discontinuity at the threshold. Table 7
reports a second type of balance tests, that is, split polynomial approximations with each
covariate as dependent variable. Only the self-employment dummy and the freshman
dummy (in the RDD sample for targeted bills, but not in the sample for absenteeism)
show a signiﬁcant discontinuity at the threshold. On the whole, these tests on a large
set of covariates support the hypothesis that pretreatment observable characteristics are
balanced around the threshold. Furthermore, among these covariates, two variables can be
plausibly considered as correlated with the main unobservable element we cannot control
for, that is, the attachment of diﬀerent politicians to their local constituency. Both Table
6 and Table 7 point out that these two variables—that is, diﬀerent residence and local
government experience—are balanced around the threshold. This indirectly supports the
plausibility of the RDD hypothesis on unobservables.
In Table 8, we apply the RDD exercise with split polynomial approximation using
as the dependent variable the share of geographically targeted bills in the pretreatment
period. In particular, we regress the share of targeted bills in term X (ﬁrst row), term XI
(second row), and both terms X and XI (third row) on the dummy of the electoral system
and a third-grade polynomial on either side of zero.21 If some politicians elected in the
majoritarian system during the legislative terms XII, XIII, or XIV had some unobservable
attachment to their local constituency, they would have presented more geographically
targeted bills even in the pretreatment period. The results of this falsiﬁcation test show
that in the pretreatment period the impact of the (future) electoral system is never statis-
21To apply this falsiﬁcation test we restrict our sample to those members observed at least once in the
pretreatment legislative terms (X and XI) and once in the treatment terms (XII, XIII, and XIV).
24tically diﬀerent from zero. This result directly supports the claim that also unobservable
characteristics are balanced around the threshold.
In Table 9, we run placebo tests at fake discontinuity points. For both outcome
variables, we estimate the jump at the median on either side of MVi = 0 with the
split polynomial approximation model. The jumps at these fake thresholds are never
statistically signiﬁcant, although we are aware that the rejection of the null hypothesis
may be due to the scarce number of observations, at least on the left of the true threshold
(that is, for dual proportional politicians).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided the ﬁrst micro evidence about the eﬀect of majoritarian
electoral systems, as opposed to proportional systems, on the behaviors of elected oﬃcials.
We believe that the use of individual-level data is particularly important here, as it allows
us to identify the exact chain of causation that links the electoral rule to the policies
implementedin democratic countries. Furthermore, the particular features of Italian two-
tier elections have allowed us to implement an RDD and disclose the causal eﬀects of
the electoral rule. We have shown that the majoritarian system increases the amount of
geographically targeted bills and reduces representatives’ shirking in a way that is both
statistically signiﬁcant and large in magnitude.
The normative implications of our empirical ﬁndings are mixed. The majoritarian
system increases the possibility of monitoring politicians and their accountability (Persson
and Tabellini, 1999; 2000), improving their commitment to parliamentary work. At the
same time, the majoritarian system stimulates the adoption of locally targeted (pork-
barrel) projects, which may end up being overprovided at the expense of broader policies
(Lizzeri and Persico, 2001). The normative analysis of this trade-oﬀ is beyond the scope
of this paper, and it is left to future research.
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27Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status, All Sample
Proportional Majoritarian Diﬀerence -diﬀ95% +diﬀ95%
Male 0.756 0.914 -0.158 -0.194 -0.122
Married 0.652 0.756 -0.104 -0.154 -0.054
Age 48.566 48.248 0.318 -0.769 1.405
Schooling 16.102 15.976 0.125 -0.143 0.393
Diﬀerent Residency 0.094 0.033 0.061 0.037 0.085
Local Govt. Exp. 0.431 0.564 -0.133 -0.188 -0.077
National Politician 0.274 0.207 0.067 0.020 0.114
Freshman 0.776 0.728 -0.048 -0.096 0.000
Incumbent 0.400 0.365 -0.034 -0.090 0.020
Switching 0.299 0.101 0.198 0.160 0.237
Center-Right 0.383 0.405 -0.021 -0.077 0.034
Parl. Appointments 0.089 0.074 0.015 -0.015 0.045
Clerk 0.051 0.051 0.000 -0.025 0.025
Lawyer 0.119 0.135 -0.016 -0.054 0.023
Executive 0.145 0.137 0.008 -0.032 0.047
Politician 0.201 0.162 0.039 -0.004 0.081
Entrepreneur 0.086 0.100 -0.013 -0.047 0.020
Teacher 0.109 0.090 0.019 -0.014 0.052
Self Employed 0.071 0.111 -0.040 -0.074 -0.006
Physician 0.053 0.090 -0.036 -0.067 -0.006
No. of Observations 394 1,305
Ministersexcluded. -diﬀ95% and +diﬀ95% representthe lower and upperbound of the 95% conﬁdenceintervalof Diﬀerence,
respectively. All variables are dummies, except Age and Schooling (both expressed in years). Diﬀerent Residency stands
for living in a diﬀerent province with respect to the one of election. Local Government Experience stands for previous
institutional experience at the local level (e.g., mayor of a city or president of a regional government). Incumbent refers to
politicians elected in the same region in the previous legislative term. Freshman means that the previous parliamentary
experience is lower than a full legislative term (5 years). Job dummies refer to the pre-election occupation.
28Table 2: Outcome Variables by Treatment Status, All Sample
Proportional Majoritarian Diﬀerence -diﬀ95% +diﬀ95%
No. of Bills 8.046 8.493 -0.448 -1.876 0.980
No. of Targeted Bills 0.652 0.981 -0.329 -0.525 -0.132
Share of Targeted Bills 0.073 0.112 -0.040 -0.061 -0.018
No. of Observations 394 1,305
Absenteeism Rate 0.366 0.309 0.057 0.032 0.082
No. of Observations 368 1,260
Ministers excluded. -diﬀ95% and +diﬀ95% represent the lower and upper bound of the 95% conﬁdence interval of Diﬀerence,
respectively. Targeted Bills are those targeted to the region of election. The Share of Targeted Bills is calculatedover the total
number of bills presented during the legislative term. Only bills presented as main sponsor are considered. The Absenteeism
Rate is the percentage of votes missed without any legitimate reason during the legislative term.
Table 3: Margin of Victory (MVi)
Proportional Majoritarian All
obs. mean obs. mean obs. mean
MVi 141 -12.75 1,305 13.56 1,446 10.99
MVi ∈ [−30,30] 125 -9.40 1,175 10.71 1,300 8.77
MVi ∈ [−20,20] 107 -6.54 987 8.02 1,094 6.59
MVi ∈ [−10,10] 83 -4.39 646 4.59 729 3.57
MVi ∈ [−5,5] 53 -2.64 362 2.33 415 1.70
MVi ∈ [−1,1] 10 -0.47 92 0.49 102 0.40
Ministers excluded. The Margin of Victory is expressed in percentage points and is deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between the representative’s vote share and the vote share of the next-best candidate.
29Table 4: Share of Geographically Targeted Bills, RDD Estimation
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
All All MVi ∈ [−h,h] MVi ∈ [−h,h]
coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e.
Majoritarian 0.082 0.034 0.082 0.031 0.068 0.029 0.064 0.027
Male 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.020
Age -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Schooling 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.004
Diﬀerent Residency -0.027 0.031 0.008 0.050
Lawyer 0.022 0.018 0.004 0.025
Executive 0.064 0.021 0.055 0.030
Politician 0.026 0.018 0.011 0.024
Entrepreneur 0.042 0.022 0.010 0.026
Teacher 0.040 0.020 0.020 0.026
Self Employed 0.061 0.020 0.052 0.028
Physician -0.012 0.020 -0.032 0.026
Freshman -0.003 0.018 0.036 0.023
Incumbent 0.019 0.012 0.028 0.016
Local Govt. Exp. 0.032 0.010 0.031 0.013
National Politician -0.024 0.013 -0.024 0.017
Parl. Appointments -0.045 0.019 -0.058 0.018
Center-Right -0.017 0.012 -0.017 0.015
Region of Election no yes no yes
Term Dummies no yes no yes
No. of Proportional 141 141 99 99
No. of Majoritarian 1,305 1,305 845 845
No. of Observations 1,446 1,446 944 944
Ministers excluded. Dependent variable: percentage of bills targeted to the region of election over the total number of
bills presented. Only bills presented as main sponsor are considered. Models (I) and (II): split polynomial approximation
(p=3). Models (III) and (IV): local linear regression (where h=15 is the optimal bandwidth selected using the cross-validation
method). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Clerk is the reference category for job dummies. See Table 1
for a description of covariates.
30Table 5: Absenteeism Rate, RDD Estimation
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
All All MVi ∈ [−h,h] MVi ∈ [−h,h]
coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e.
Majoritarian -0.149 0.051 -0.109 0.047 -0.128 0.043 -0.102 0.040
Male 0.000 0.019 0.004 0.024
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001
Schooling 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004
Diﬀerent Residency 0.125 0.043 0.108 0.060
Lawyer 0.059 0.022 0.031 0.027
Executive 0.012 0.023 -0.026 0.028
Politician 0.003 0.021 -0.022 0.027
Entrepreneur 0.025 0.023 -0.031 0.028
Teacher -0.040 0.022 -0.083 0.028
Self Employed 0.010 0.022 0.014 0.028
Physician 0.034 0.025 0.011 0.030
Freshman -0.061 0.018 -0.055 0.024
Incumbent -0.007 0.014 -0.009 0.018
Local Govt. Exp. -0.018 0.012 -0.013 0.015
National Politician 0.105 0.016 0.102 0.021
Parl. Appointments 0.063 0.024 0.066 0.034
Center-Right 0.054 0.013 0.074 0.015
Region of Election no yes no yes
Term Dummies no yes no yes
No. of Proportional 134 134 89 89
No. of Majoritarian 1,260 1,260 773 773
No. of Observations 1,394 1,394 862 862
Ministers excluded. Dependent variable: absenteeism rate (i.e., the percentage of votes missed without any legitimate reason
during the legislative term). Models (I) and (II): split polynomial approximation (p=3). Models (III) and (IV): local linear
regression (where h=14 is the optimal bandwidth selected using the cross-validation method). Standard errors are clustered
at the individual level. Clerk is the reference category for job dummies. See Table 1 for a description of covariates.
31Table 6: Balance Tests with Local Linear Regression
RDD-I Sample RDD-II Sample
discontinuity s.e. obs. discontinuity s.e. obs.
Male -0.043 0.053 729 -0.035 0.060 698
Married -0.072 0.093 729 -0.130 0.092 698
Age -0.230 1.959 729 -0.561 2.109 698
Schooling -0.280 0.477 729 -0.322 0.530 698
Diﬀerent Residency -0.020 0.072 729 0.055 0.057 698
Local Govt. Exp. 0.065 0.115 729 0.097 0.125 698
National Politician 0.060 0.086 729 0.043 0.098 698
Freshman 0.175 0.094 729 0.134 0.097 698
Incumbent -0.114 0.112 729 -0.162 0.121 698
Center-Right -0.075 0.114 729 -0.121 0.122 698
Parl. Appointments 0.008 0.067 729 0.039 0.065 698
Clerk 0.008 0.031 729 0.021 0.030 698
Lawyer -0.008 0.074 729 0.013 0.073 698
Executive -0.126 0.102 729 -0.116 0.112 698
Politician -0.025 0.075 729 -0.013 0.081 698
Entrepreneur -0.084 0.076 729 -0.113 0.087 698
Teacher 0.081 0.068 729 0.073 0.078 698
Self Employed 0.166 0.041 729 0.148 0.043 698
Physician -0.029 0.083 729 -0.046 0.097 698
Ministers excluded. Local linear regressions (h=10) with each of the listed covariates as dependent variable. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. See Table 1 for a description of covariates. RDD-I Sample is the sample used in
the RDD estimation of the share of targeted bills (see Table 4). RDD-II Sample is the sample used in the RDD estimation
of the absenteeism rate (see Table 5).
32Table 7: Balance Tests with Split Polynomial Approximation
RDD-I Sample RDD-II Sample
discontinuity s.e. obs. discontinuity s.e. obs.
Male -0.087 0.061 1,446 -0.087 0.068 1,394
Married -0.018 0.091 1,446 -0.075 0.089 1,394
Age 0.877 2.035 1,446 0.544 2.120 1,394
Schooling -0.161 0.466 1,446 -0.200 0.511 1,394
Diﬀerent Residency -0.054 0.062 1,446 0.018 0.032 1,394
Local Govt. Exp. 0.067 0.117 1,446 0.091 0.122 1,394
National Politician 0.072 0.088 1,446 0.050 0.097 1,394
Freshman 0.209 0.098 1,446 0.172 0.105 1,394
Incumbent -0.150 0.115 1,446 -0.195 0.121 1,394
Center-Right -0.080 0.114 1,446 -0.130 0.118 1,394
Parl. Appointments -0.036 0.064 1,446 -0.013 0.062 1,394
Clerk -0.003 0.031 1,446 0.010 0.030 1,394
Lawyer -0.039 0.079 1,446 -0.018 0.075 1,394
Executive -0.146 0.097 1,446 -0.139 0.104 1,394
Politician -0.005 0.076 1,446 0.003 0.078 1,394
Entrepreneur -0.103 0.076 1,446 -0.136 0.085 1,394
Teacher 0.070 0.066 1,446 0.060 0.074 1,394
Self Employed 0.179 0.039 1,446 0.172 0.044 1,394
Physician -0.017 0.081 1,446 -0.038 0.081 1,394
Ministers excluded. Split polynomial approximations (p=3) with each of the listed covariates as dependent variable. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the individual level. See Table 1 for a description of covariates. RDD-I Sample is the sample
used in the RDD estimation of the share of targeted bills (see Table 4). RDD-II Sample is the sample used in the RDD
estimation of the absenteeism rate (see Table 5).
33Table 8: Falsiﬁcation Tests, Geographically Targeted Bills in Pre-Treatment Terms
discontinuity s.e. obs.
Targeted Bills X -0.002 0.003 81
Targeted Bills XI 0.052 0.118 255
Targeted Bills X-XI 0.041 0.089 271
Ministers excluded. Split polynomial approximations (p=3) with the following dependent
variables: percentage of bills targeted to the region of election over the total number of bills
presented in the X legislative term, XI legislative term, or both.
Table 9: Placebo Tests, Geographically Targeted Bills and Absenteeism Rate
percentile discontinuity s.e. obs.
Targeted Bills:
50th left 0.055 0.079 141
50th right 0.019 0.038 1,305
Absenteeism Rate:
50th left 0.062 0.108 134
50th right 0.039 0.039 1,260
Ministers excluded. Dependent variables: share of geographically targeted bills and absenteeism
rate. Split polynomial approximations (p=3) at fake discontinuity points, i.e., the median of the
margin of victory on either side of the true threshold (MVi = 0). Standard errors are clustered at
the individual level.




































Running-mean smoothing of the share of targeted bills with re-
spect to the margin of victory (bandwidth equal to 1 percentage
point). The smoothing is performed separately above and below
the threshold (MVi = 0).


































Running-mean smoothing of the absenteeism rate with respect to
the margin of victory (bandwidth equal to 1 percentage point).
The smoothing is performed separately above and below the
threshold (MVi = 0).
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